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Abstract—The availability of complex temporal datasets in so-
cial, health and consumer contexts has driven the development of
pattern mining techniques that enable the use of classical machine
learning tools for model building. In this work we introduce a
robust temporal pattern mining framework for finding predictive
patterns in complex timestamped multivariate and noisy data.
We design an algorithm RobustSPAM that enables mining of
temporal patterns from data with noisy timestamps. We apply
our algorithm to social care data from a local government body
and investigate how the efficiency and accuracy of the method
depends on the level of noise. We further explore the trade-off
between the loss of predictivity due to perturbation of timestamps
and the risk of person re-identification.
Index Terms—robust, temporal pattern, noisy data, privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
The widespread collection of data in social, health and con-
sumer contexts has contributed to the availability of complex
temporal datasets. Data instances collected in these datasets
are characterized by a variable number of irregularly spaced
timestamped events that include information about continuous
activities and instantaneous events (e.g. Electronic Health
Records, machine log files, credit/debit card use). The increase
in the number of complex temporal datasets has prompted the
development of methods that extend applicability of classical
statistical, machine learning and data mining methods to those
datasets [1]–[3]. This is particularly important in monitoring
or detection problems such as: patient monitoring [4] or fraud
detection [5]. These methods involve identification of relevant
temporal patterns of events. Patterns represent sequences of
time-point (or time-intervals) events. They are used to encode
original variable-length data instances as fixed-length binary
vectors representing presence or absence of chosen patterns
therefore enabling application of existing classification and
prediction tools.
Existing temporal pattern mining algorithms extend sequen-
tial pattern mining methods to a more complex case of time-
related pattern mining. They are based on time point or interval
representations of the data and are typically exploiting Allen-
type relationships [6]. They require a temporal abstraction of
the raw data into ordered coded events (e.g. two weeks of
high blood pressure) [7]. This recoded data is searched for
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frequent sequential patterns using algorithms such as Gener-
alized Sequential Pattern algorithm (GSP) [8], PrefixSpan [9],
Sequential PAttern Mining (SPAM) [10] or Sequential PAttern
Discovery using Equivalence classes (SPADE) [11]. The ap-
plication of the above algorithms to monitoring and detection
tasks has been successful for datasets with accurately recorded
timestamps. Our objective is to build a frequent pattern mining
algorithm that performs well in mining temporal data that
include error/noise in the timestamps, a common occurrence
in manually maintained databases. The existing methods will
not work for noisy data as the noise may perturb frequent
patterns into a large number of rare patterns, which therefore
will be excluded from the inference or, if included, may lead
to over-fitting of a trained model.
This paper makes two contributions. Firstly, we design a
robust approach for analysis of longitudinal data that can ac-
count for noise/errors in the recorded timestamps. Such errors
are common in information systems maintained manually such
as health records or social care systems. Errors in inputting
information in the system might result in different or even
reverse temporal relations which are not true (for example
event A was recorded after event B whereas they took place
in the reverse order). Existing algorithms that allow for some
tolerance [3] take into account constant error margins around
intervals. Our contribution is both theoretical (formulation of
robust temporal patterns) and algorithmic (efficient methods
for identification of such robust patterns which go beyond and
are significantly harder than classical problems of sequential
pattern mining). Our approach focuses on using time points
instead of intervals and fitting probabilistic models for the
errors in the time stamp around these time points. Intervals
are represented as a start point and an end point with possibly
different errors around those points. This representation allows
for intuitive and relatively compact representation of patterns
while still retaining predictive power similar to interval-based
methods. Moreover, we noticed significant gains in terms
of computational and algorithmic complexity in our robust
pattern mining algorithm compared to a similar approach that
we explored for interval mining (not reported in the paper, but
will be clear to the reader after reading this article).
Our second contribution concerns privacy preserva-
tion/statistical disclosure problems in the context of longitudi-
nal data. As such data contain rich temporal information, they
may be used in person re-identification [12], [13]. A typical
approach of using aggregate statistics is often insufficient
for complex datasets as experience in [14] shows. Instead,
we borrow from a classical approach in statistical disclosure
and perturb timestamps with a random noise. Analysis with
such perturbed data is possible through our robust times-
tamps approach. We measure the risk of re-identification with
the Unicity measure [15]. This represents the percentage of
uniquely identified records given a number of points in time.
We will report on the performance of this method in predictive
modeling; in particular, we will discuss the loss of predictive
power and the sensitivity to specification of the noise.
As a test ground for our methods we will use a risk stratifi-
cation problem in Adult Social Care. The dataset is provided
by a local authority and contains for each client: timestamped
referrals, assessments, reviews and services provided as well
as static health and socio-economic descriptors. The aim is
to identify clients that are at the highest risk of moving into
expensive care (such as nursing or residential care) in order
to provide additional services to extend their independence.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces
the classification problem. In Section III, we provide the
mathematical foundation for defining robust order and robust
pattern. Section IV describes the TestPattern algorithm and
Robust Sequential Pattern Mining (RobustSPAM) algorithms.
In Section V we explore the performance of the RobustSPAM
algorithm, analyze the loss of predictive power due to the noise
and the trade-off between the noise and privacy preservation.
Section VI concludes this work.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
The general approach for modeling temporal datasets is de-
fined as follows. Let D = {〈xi, yi〉}ni=1 be a training dataset:
xi ∈ X is a collection of multidimensional timestamped
instances and yi ∈ Y is a class label associated with xi. The
main aim is to learn a function f : X → Y that can classify
unlabeled instances.
The dataset considered in this paper was provided by
a local government body and comprises information from
an Adult Social Care system. Every data instance xi is a
complete record of interactions with and services provided for
a client. There are four main activities reported in the systems:
referrals, assessments, services and reviews. The class label
yi denotes whether or not a client is in receipt of one of two
expensive services (nursing or residence housing). A similar
problem, although on a shorter time scale, has been studied
for electronic health records (EHR) in [16].
Data instances are characterized by a variable number of
irregularly timestamped events. We may have a situation that
a client was referred for a need of care but was not eligible
to receive any service then, but after a number of years ended
up with the same referral reason and received a number of
services. There are groups of clients (e.g mental health or
disability problems) that receive support throughout their lives
and groups of people that have single events like equipment or
home adaptation only. This heterogeneity of client data means
that a classifier cannot be learnt directly from the data.
A common approach for timestamped datasets is to apply
a (dataset-based) transformation φ : X → X ′ that maps each
instance xi into a fix-length vector x
′
i while retaining as much
as possible temporal characteristics of xi. In this work we
use a dynamic transformation as proposed in [16]. We learn
transformation φ from data using temporal pattern mining by
following the steps:
1) convert activities (events and intervals) into point-time
sequences of events,
2) find frequent temporal patterns from the event sequence
data.
Having transformed data D′ = {〈x′i, yi〉}ni=1 we can use
classical machine learning methods to learn the classifier.
Electronic health records, social care records and other
manually maintained datasets often contain errors in reporting
timestamps. We also consider the case when data contain
noise introduced in the process of anonymization. Current
approaches for temporal pattern mining do not take these
scenarios into account. Temporal patterns are searched within
sequences of events ordered using time-point and/or interval
relationships (e.g Allen’s relations [17]) which assume accu-
rate timestamps, therefore affecting pattern discovery. In this
paper we address this problem. We propose a robust pattern
mining algorithm for pattern discovery and we provide the
analysis of the classifier predictive power vs the added noise
to the timestamps. In the following sections we will explain
in details steps of our modeling approach.
III. ROBUST TEMPORAL PATTERNS
A. Event Abstraction
Let Σ be an abstraction alphabet that represents a finite
set of permitted abstractions. A multivariate variable xi is
transformed into an event representation ei = 〈ci, ti〉 with
ci ∈ Σ. In what follows we will write t(ei) for ti and
ei for ci. Temporal abstractions have been well studied for
transformation of numerical time series variables to a high
level qualitative representation [7]. In case of EHR data, each
clinical variable is transformed to an interval-based repre-
sentation [16]. For categorical data, the alphabet Σ consists
simply of all categories. Unfortunately, in many cases an
event ei is described by more than one categorical value (e.g.,
location and type of medical intervention). Constructing an
alphabet through a product of possible categories leads usually
to impractically large number of event codes (c.f. column 3 of
Table IV) making the pattern mining part very computationally
intensive and inference often infeasible. In such cases there is
a need to recode categories and arrange them in hierarchies
which can then be used at a different level of detail.
In this work we consider a social care dataset from a
local government body with categorical variables only. To
demonstrate the complexity of the data mentioned in the
previous paragraph, a referral activity has been coded using
three significant variables: source (by whom the referral was
e1 e2
e2 e1
Fig. 1. Effect of noise in timestamps on relative position of events on time
axis. The top picture shows real times when events occurred. The effect of
noise in timestamps in presented on the bottom picture.
made), reason (why) and outcome (action taken after the
referral was made). The source categories were grouped into
two categories: health (H) when referral came from primary
or secondary care and other (O) representing e.g. police,
self-referral, family/neighbors, legal agent, etc. The variable
Reason was grouped in a number of categories such as (need
for assessment (A.1), referral to mental health (A.3), carer
assessment (C) etc.). The outcome variable includes: support
plan amended (A.1), accept for assessment (A.2), accept for
disability services (B.1), other decision (J). We represent the
code for a referral activity as activity type-source-reason-
outcome, e.g. Ref-O-A.1-J or Ref-H-C-B.1.
After abstracting all variables/activities, we represent an
instance xi as a sequence of events (SE) sorted according
to their timestamps ti:
SEi = 〈e1, e2, e3, . . . , el〉,
where t(el) ≤ t(el+1).
B. Robust Temporal Relationship
Consider two events e1 and e2 that occur at times t(e1) and
t(e2). Their relationship can be described in the following
way:
• e1 is before e2 (one event happens before the other event);
• e1 co-occurs with e2 (both events happen at the same
time).
In standard approaches, both relations are described with the
following order:
e2 ≥ e1 ⇔ t(e2)− t(e1) ≥ 0 (1)
The underlying assumption above is that observed data are
exact. However, when timestamps are recorded with an error
or are noisy, the relation between recorded timestamps t(e2) ≥
t(e1) may not imply that e2 really happened after e1. In this
paper we introduce a robust relation between events that is
immune to such noisy perturbation of timestamps.
Definition 1: (Robust ordering) Event e1 happens before e2
in robust ordering with respect to β, denoted as e1  e2, if
t(e2)− t(e1) ≥ β(e1, e2). (2)
An ordering is called separable if
β(e1, e2) = βˆ(e1) + βˆ(e2) (3)
for a function βˆ depending on the event code.
Example.
Assume that the noise introduced to the timestamps is nor-
mally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2, independently
from the type of event. Denoting by t(·) a recorded timestamp
and by t∗(·) a real timestamp, we have
t(·) = t∗(·) + ǫ, ǫ ∼ N(0, σ2).
We want to find a threshold K such that
P (t(e2)− t(e1) ≥ K︸︷︷︸
β(e1,e2)
| t∗(e1) ≤ t∗(e2)) ≥ α
for some confidence level α, e.g., α = 95%. Then setting
βˆ(·) = K/2 defines a separable robust ordering such that
t∗(e1) ≤ t∗(e2) implies that e1  e2 with probability α, i.e.,
we identify the true ordering of events with probability α.
Notice that a normally distributed noise does not allow for
identification with probability 1 as the noise can potentially
be arbitrarily large (however with a very small probability).
We compute
P (t(e2)− t(e1) ≥ K | t∗(e1) ≤ t∗(e2))
≥ P (t(e2)− t(e1) ≥ K | t∗(e1) = t∗(e2))
= P (t∗(e2) + ǫ2 − t∗(e1)− ǫ1 ≥ K | t∗(e1) = t∗(e2))
= P ( ǫ2 − ǫ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
N(0,2σ2)
≥ K)
= P (
ǫ2 − ǫ1√
2σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
N(0,1)
≥ K√
2σ
) = Φ
(
− K√
2σ
)
Therefore,
P (t(e2)− t(e1) ≥ K | t∗(e1) ≤ t∗(e2)) ≥ α
if
Φ
(
− K√
2σ
)
= α,
i.e.,
K = −
√
2σΦ−1(α).
This yields a robust separable ordering with a constant func-
tion
βˆ ≡ −
√
2
2
σΦ−1(α).
Taking α = 50% gives βˆ = 0 and reclaims an ordinary
ordering of real numbers. In practice, one will usually use
α > 50%; for example α = 90% gives K ≈ −1.38σ. ⊳
Notice that unlike the exact relation between true times-
tamps t∗(·), the robust ordering defined above is not transitive
if βˆ < 0. Indeed, assume that e1  e2  e3. This means that
t(e2)− t(e1) ≥ βˆ(e1) + βˆ(e2),
t(e3)− t(e2) ≥ βˆ(e2) + βˆ(e3).
From here we can only deduce that
t(e3)− t(e1) ≥ βˆ(e1) + 2βˆ(e2) + βˆ(e3),
while the right hand side is smaller (because βˆ(e2) < 0) than
βˆ(e1) + βˆ(e3) which defines the relation e1  e3.
C. Robust Temporal Patterns
The lack of transitivity of robust ordering means that
representations of temporal patterns may be very complicated
as temporal relationship between every pair of events has to be
specified. In this paper, motivated by computational tractabil-
ity, we restrict attention to patterns in which consecutive events
are assumed to be ordered according to the robust ordering .
This means that a pattern can be represented by a sequence of
events and the robustness only enters at the stage of verifying
if it is contained in a given instance.
Definition 2: (Temporal Pattern) A temporal pattern is a
sequence of events P = 〈p1, p2, . . . , pk〉. The size |P | (also
denoted length(P )) of P is defined as the number k of events
in the sequence.
Definition 3: (Robust inclusion) An instance xi with the
event representation SEi = 〈e1, e2, . . . , el〉 contains a pattern
P = 〈p1, p2, . . . , pk〉, denoted P ∈ SEi, if there is a one-to-
one mapping p from {1, . . . , k} to {1, . . . , l} such that
∀i∈1,...,k : epi  epi+1 ,
where  is a robust ordering.
IV. TEMPORAL PATTERN MINING ALGORITHM FOR
ROBUST TIMESTAMPS
In this section, we present an algorithm for mining frequent
robust temporal patterns. The algorithm takes as an input D:
the sequence of events (SE) representation for each client and
the function βˆ. It finds all frequent l-length patterns with the
length l within given bounds similarly as in the classical SPAM
[10]. The procedure is iterative and follows the following two
phases:
1) (candidate generation phase) generate a candidate pat-
tern by extending a frequent l-pattern using depth-first-
search (DFS) algorithm (as in SPAM),
2) (counting phase) accept the new pattern if it has support
at least τ , i.e. the proportion of records that contain it
is at least τ . This is where our algorithmic contribution
lies.
An l-pattern is a sequence s = 〈e1, e2, . . . , el〉 and s ∈ SE.
Its extension comprises adding a new event code at the end.
If the sequence s is not frequent any child sequence generated
from s cannot be frequent, which allows for truncation of the
search tree. This is called an a priori principle [18].
In the following subsection we describe details of these
steps.
A. Candidate Generation
To generate candidates we used the depth-first search (DFS)
approach as it was proposed in [10]. We start at the root
node with a 0-pattern. At each node n we extend the l-pattern
adding a new event ek at its tail and we calculate its support.
If the support of a generated pattern s is greater than minimum
support threshold τ , we store that sequence and repeat DFS
recursively on s. The maximum length of any sequence is
limited since the input database is finite. If the support of
Algorithm 1 RobustSPAM
Input: prefix, D, Sn, maxlen, τ , β
1: sTemp = ∅
2: sPattern = ∅
3: for (ci : Sn) do
4: pattern = (prefix, ci)
5: support = GetSupport(D, pattern, β)
6: if (support > τ ) then
7: store pattern
8: sTemp = sTemp ∪ ci
9: sPattern = sPattern ∪ pattern
10: end if
11: end for
12: for (i : sPattern) do
13: if (maxlen > |i|) then
14: RobustSPAM(i, D, sTemp, maxlen, τ , β)
15: end if
16: end for
Algorithm 2 GetSupport
Input: D, pattern[], β
1: count = 0
2: for (i : D) do
3: Convert SEi to tuple representation T[] = {(t, st, c)}
using β
4: count=count + TestPattern(T[], pattern[])
5: end for
6: return count/|D|
s is less than τ , then we do not need to repeat DFS on s
as indicated by the a priori principle. If none of the generated
children are frequent, then the node is a leaf and we backtrack
up the tree and follow further steps of DFS procedure. Details
are provided in Algorithm 1, RobustSPAM (Robust Sequential
Pattern Mining). The algorithm takes the following inputs: a
prefix (l-pattern to be extended), data D, a list possible events
for extensions Sn, maximum pattern length maxlen and the
minimal support τ . In the first iteration Sn = Σ.
B. Pattern Count
In contrast to other temporal pattern mining algorithms
the counting phase is challenging due to robust timestamps.
In existing algorithms only the time order of events matters
and standard subsequence matching algorithms suffice; their
complexity is linear with respect to the length of the record.
However, in the case of robust timestamps a definitive ordering
of events cannot be established (c.f. Definition 3) and existing
sequence matching algorithms cannot be applied. We therefore
designed an algorithm for pattern matching which, thanks to
the particular choice of function β(e1, e2) = βˆ(e1) + βˆ(e2)
with βˆ < 0, has also a linear complexity – the feature crucial
for the efficiency of our approach.
The following observation lies at the roots of our algorithm:
e1  e2 if and only if
t(e2)− βˆ(e2) ≥ t1 + βˆ(e1).
(Recall that βˆ(·) < 0.) Figure 2 presents the robust order
e1  e2 between events e1 and e2.
e1 e2
−βˆ(e1)
−βˆ(e2)
Fig. 2. Robust order for pattern count algorithm.
Following the above observation, we recode events for each
client in the following way. For each event, we create two
tuples (t,st,c) representing timestamp (t), status (st) and event
code (c) as follows:(
t(ei) + βˆ(ei), ”start”, ei)
)
,
(
t(ei)− βˆ(ei), ”end”, ei)
)
.
For each client, those tuples are sorted with respect to (t)
and stored in table T[] (see Algorithm 2), which forms the
input to Algorithm 3. We use two arrays Active[] and Used[]
that keep track of active event codes that can be used to
match a pattern and those events which have already been
matched, respectively. We walk through the table T[]. When
we encounter a starting tuple (status=”start”) we increase the
count for the code of this event within Active[] array. Then we
test if there is a match with a corresponding event code in the
pattern. If yes then we increase the event count in Used[] array
and we test consecutive event code from the pattern against all
the active but not already used codes. This is repeated until
all event codes in Active[] are used. We then proceed with
the next element from T[]. If the tuple status represents the
closing intervals then we reduce the count in Active[] and
Used[] arrays (the event is no more available for a matching).
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present results for a dataset on provision
of adult social care by a local government. We test our
approach when timestamps are perturbed by various levels
of additive (Gaussian) noise thus enabling comparison to a
benchmark model obtained under the assumption that the
original dataset is free of inaccuracies in timestamp recording.
We further explore the trade-off between privacy preservation
through perturbation of timestamps and the loss of predictive
power.
A. Dataset
The original dataset consists of 100,000 records of adult
social care clients. For each client, there is an independent
variable (label) yes/no describing if the client is in receipt of
an expensive social care support package. Each client’s record
comprises a number of activities and their timestamps. There
are four types of activities: referrals, assessments, services and
reviews. Activities are described in the original dataset by a
Algorithm 3 TestPattern
Input: T[], pattern[]
1: Active[]=0, Used[]=0, j = 0, x = 0
2: for i = 1 to n do
3: (t,st,c) := T[i]
4: if (st==”start”) then
5: Active[c]++
6: if (pattern[j]==c) then
7: ps = pattern[j]
8: do
9: Used[ps]++
10: j++
11: ps = pattern[j]
12: while Active[ps]-Used[ps]> 0 &j < |pattern|)
13: if (j==|pattern|) then
14: x = 1
15: exit
16: end if
17: end if
18: else
19: Active[c]−−
20: Used[c] = max(0, Used[c]-1)
21: end if
22: end for
23: return x
TABLE I
RE-CODING ACTIVITIES TO THE EVENT REPRESENTATION.
Event Type Potential no. codes No. codes in data
referral 260 18
assessments 16 10
services 116 90
reviews 17 8
number of attributes. We transformed them into a coded event
dataset, see Table I. The referral event code is composed of
three parts: source (who made a referral) – 2 categories; reason
(why the service is needed) – 12 categories and outcome
(decision for assessment) – 15 categories. The assessment
activity was coded using only one variable – eligibility with 16
categories. The service activity was coded with 116 categories
and the review activity – with 17 categories. The numbers
of all possible codes for each event type is presented in the
second column of Table I. The actual number of codes found
within the dataset are showed in the last column of the same
table.
For each client we represented the data as a sequence of
events, sorting them by the timestamp. We selected 42,585
clients – those with more than three events |SEi| > 3.
We used this dataset to test model classification performance
with an increasing level of timestamp perturbation. Further, to
explore in more detail the risk of person re-identification and
to analyze the loss of predicting power for our classifier to
specification of the introduced noise, we selected 2000 clients
and restricted their data to services only: there were 60 event
type codes describing a type of service the client received. To
increase the accuracy of the reference model (so that the effect
of noise is clearer) we artificially assigned labels 0 and 1 to
clients using clustering methods based on frequent temporal
patterns.
B. Workflow of the Experiment
The experiment was performed in two steps:
1) Classification performance - to test ability of the Ro-
bustSPAM algorithm to find patterns in noisy (randomly
perturbed) data.
2) Detailed analysis of the trade-off between the loss of
predictive power and the ability to re-identify individuals
from timestamps.
In the first step we used original label defining if a person
receives an expensive care support package. We followed the
workflow provided in Section II. We converted activities into
point-time sequences of events. We then perturbed timestamps
by adding noise as follows:
timestamp −→ timestamp+ noise N(0, γ2) in days,
where N(0, γ2) stands for the normal distribution with the
mean 0 and the variance γ2. We applied the RobustSPAM
algorithm for βˆ(·) = 2γ to find frequent patterns. Then we
transformed the sequences of events into a binary matrix where
each column represented presence (1) or absence (0) in a client
record of a frequent pattern. The random forest model was
used as a classifier.
In the second step, we used a similar procedure but extended
the range of γ and assessed the probability of re-identification.
In both cases we mined frequent robust temporal patterns
from each class label separately. Using local minimum support
rather than global minimum support for the entire training
dataset allows for finding patterns relevant for a given class,
particularly in the case of unbalanced data.
C. Classification Performance
In this section we test the ability of our RobustSPAM
algorithm to capture temporal patterns that are important for
prediction. We compare our results with the original SPAM
algorithm applied on unperturbed dataset. The dataset included
107 codes representing: referrals, assessment, service and
review activities for 42,585 clients. The total number of 17503
clients was labeled as not using expensive care, whereas
25083 were labeled as recipients of an expensive care support
package.
Firstly, we used the SPAM algorithm [10] to find frequent
patterns for non-perturbed data. Then we used these patterns
to build random forest classifier. To build a classifier we split
dataset into two sets: training and testing. The training dataset
included 4000 clients that were balanced equally between two
classes. The testing dataset contained the remaining records.
We used the same training and testing datasets for the Ro-
bustSPAM algorithm. Introducing different levels of noise to
timestamps we tested the ability of the RobustSPAM to find
important predictive patterns. The results of the analysis are
presented in Table II. For each level of noise γ (here γ is
the standard deviation of the Gaussian noise) we collected
frequent patterns and the model performance for the training
and testing datasets. To decide if a pattern is frequent we
used 10% minimum support. The minimum pattern length
was set to 3 and we allowed patterns to grow to the max-
imum length. Sensitivity (true positive rate) represents the
proportion of clients who are at risk of expensive care and are
correctly classified. Specificity (true negative rate) represents
a proportion of clients that are not at risk of expensive care
and are correctly classified. The difference between sensitivity
and specificity is bigger for the testing dataset than for the
training dataset because the majority of clients in the testing
dataset are not at risk of expensive care. The significant drop
in the model accuracy is observed only for the noise with the
standard deviation ≥ 50 days.
The original SPAM and RobustSPAM with γ = 0 find
the same patterns within the data (as expected), see the
column Patterns in the first two rows of Table II (different
values of accuracy are caused by randomness involved in the
construction of the random forest classifier). When we add
noise (reported as the standard deviation γ in days) we notice
an increase of the number of patterns and a drop in the model
predictive power suggesting the loss of important temporal
information from the data. The increase in the number of
identified patterns is due the algorithm relaxing conditions for
matching a pattern (so that the noise does not prevent patterns
to be found in data) allowing, therefore, more patterns to reach
the required support level. However, some predictive power is
retained even for large noise, which may be explained by the
fact that the presence of certain (atemporal) combinations of
events is significant for the prediction.
D. Predictivity and Re-identification vs Noise
In this section we restrict attention to a smaller population
of 2000 clients and with reduced number of codes as explained
in Subsection V-A. This enables us to make a more thorough
analysis of the link between the noise, the predictive power
and the risk of re-identification. The latter is assessed based
on a modification of the unicity measure for spacio-temporal
data [13].
1) Unicity Measure: The unicity measure was introduced
in [13] as the risk of client re-identification knowing p pieces
of spatio-temporal information about a user. The algorithm
proposed in [15] is based on the Monte Carlo paradigm. For
p randomly selected points from a randomly selected client’s
sequence of events (e.g. mobile phone or credit card usage),
one counts how many clients have the same subset of events
within their records. This is repeated many times and the
percentage of those with an unique p-sequence of events is
reported.
We use the unicity measure to analyze risk of re-
identification using coded longitudinal data. In our framework,
codes replace the spatial information in the original algorithm
and time is measured with daily accuracy. We applied the
TABLE II
CLASSIFICATION PERFORMANCE.
algorithm noise γ Patterns Train Acc Train Sn Train Sp Test Acc Test Sn Test Sp
SPAM NA 4454 0.8012 0.8193 0.7851 0.8019 0.8939 0.7069
RobustSPAM 0 4454 0.8018 0.8178 0.7872 0.7974 0.8908 0.7017
RobustSPAM 2 5101 0.8058 0.8365 0.7801 0.7967 0.8887 0.7016
RobustSPAM 7 6622 0.7975 0.8073 0.7883 0.7935 0.8804 0.7012
RobustSPAM 14 9019 0.7887 0.8203 0.7629 0.7884 0.8815 0.6928
RobustSPAM 25 13622 0.7827 0.789 0.7768 0.7866 0.8791 0.6912
RobustSPAM 50 29764 0.6158 0.6226 0.6097 0.5986 0.7173 0.5004
Fig. 3. Predictivity vs level of noise
TABLE III
RISK OF RE-IDENTIFICATION VS LEVEL OF NOISE.
Noise γ p=2 p=3 p=4 p=5 p=6
0 0.62 0.95 0.99 0.99 1
1 0.21 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.99
7 0.07 0.46 0.79 0.92 0.97
12.5 0.05 0.32 0.66 0.85 0.93
25 0.03 0.21 0.47 0.69 0.82
100 0.01 0.06 0.17 0.30 0.42
250 0.006 0.02 0.07 0.13 0.21
500 0.005 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.13
5000 0.003 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.08
algorithm for various levels of perturbation of timestamps.
Table III collects the results.
2) Loss in Model Prediction: For a selection of noise
standard deviations γ reported in first column of Table IV, we
perturbed the data and applied our inference approach with
robust timestamps. Each model was generated on the same
training sample of 800 clients and tested on the remaining
1200 clients. Both datasets were balanced.
Figure 3 presents the model predictivity as a function of
the noise standard deviation γ; exact values and the number
of patterns found are collected in Table IV. Comparison of
Tables III and IV yields a conclusion that the noise with
standard deviation of γ = 25 days retains good predictivity
while providing good prevention of re-identification based on
2 external observations and acceptable for 3 observations.
Increasing noise to γ = 100 strongly improves the privacy
(even at the level of 6 observations) but at a cost of a visible
TABLE IV
TESTING SET ACCURACY VS LEVEL OF NOISE.
Noise γ Patterns Acc Sn Sp
0 13 0.99 0.99 1
1 27 0.94 0.94 0.94
7 40 0.91 0.90 0.92
12.5 45 0.90 0.89 0.90
25 59 0.87 0.85 0.88
100 218 0.79 0.75 0.82
250 565 0.70 0.62 0.78
500 819 0.66 0.59 0.73
5000 1283 0.64 0.57 0.72
loss of predictive power. Taking into account that this test was
performed on a small dataset of 2000 individuals, we may
conclude that the perturbation of timestamps in the whole
dataset of over 42,000 clients should provide significantly
stronger privacy protection. Further investigations will be
taken up in future research.
All experiments were conducted on Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-
4790 3.0Ghz CPU and 16GB of RAM.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Techniques for mining (time-point) sequential data as well
as methods to mine time-interval data have been developed
over the last twenty years. These algorithms have been suc-
cessfully used for datasets with accurately recorded times-
tamps. However, existing methods do not work for noisy data
as the noise may blow a true frequent pattern into a large
number of rare patterns, which therefore will be excluded
from the inference or, if included, may lead to over-fitting
of a trained model.
In this paper we proposed a new robust temporal pat-
tern mining framework for finding predictive patterns in the
presence of error/noise in timestamps, a common occurrence
in manually maintained databases. We presented an a priori
algorithm RobustSPAM that mines time-point patterns and is
extendable to time-interval data via encoding the beginning
and the end of an interval as two time-point events. Evaluation
on adult social care data, comprising both time-point and
time-interval data, showed that the algorithm successfully
finds patterns that are important for client risk stratification.
Due to increased concerns about data privacy and recent
research showing that longitudinal data are at high risk of
re-identification, we explored the trade-off between the loss
of predictivity due to random perturbation of timestamps and
the risk of person re-identification.
Future work includes optimization of the RobustSPAM
algorithm and extension to other specifications of the function
β(e1, e2), which will bring algorithmic and conceptual chal-
lenges. We also plan tests of the methodology on Delirium
EHR dataset when screening process is completed and we
obtain an official permission to use that dataset.
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